On basic economic education

I am not an economist by any stretch of the word. And for a long time, I had no clue about basic economic subjects, everyday stuff really. Like where do banks get the money to remunerate my saving account. Or what is backing up the currency I use everyday, what is it that gives it value. Gold in a vault somewhere at the central bank would it seem. Or would it? I actually had no clue that I had no clue, things were working the way they were and there was no need to ask questions. Until I started asking myself questions. And I found out that understanding these concepts is important. I should have been taught that at school, very early on. Would you not agree?

So where do banks get the money to remunerate saving account? If you deposit money at the bank and the bank pays you interest on it, it must be getting the money somewhere else to pay you. It is in fact lending the money you deposited to people or institutions who need financing and making them pay interest on the loan. Car loan, housing loan, personal loan, you name it. The difference between the rate at which the bank remunerate your deposit and the rate it charges on the loans makes out its profit. Pretty simple right?
Here’s a mind twister then. Where does the bank store its money? In a vault you could argue, and you would be right to a certain extent. After all, automatic teller machines at any given branch of the bank dispense cash out of a secure mini vault. But the bulk of money at the bank disposal at any given time is digital. A number on an account in a given currency, and treated exactly as you would treat your money: most of it is sitting on an account at the bank, and very little in your pockets. Realizing this opens up a whole new dimension of questions you could ask yourself. If the accounts under your name are sitting at your local bank, then where are the accounts holding your local bank’s money? “At your local bank” sounds like a reasonable enough answer, but think again. If you want to check your balance, you would log into your bank online page, enter a username and password and access your account. It is not in an Excel file on your laptop. It is quite similar for a bank, its accounts are held at another bank, the correspondent bank. For instance, a European bank which domestic currency is the Euro has Euro accounts opened at the central bank, which are remunerated just like any other interest baring account. It may also have US Dollars accounts held at US correspondent banks or Pound Sterling accounts at a UK correspondent bank. 
At this point, you might start to suspect how the United States can enforce fiscal policies like the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) to actors who do not fall under US authority. Given that any bank in the world accesses US Dollars through a US correspondent bank, barring US financial institutions from engaging in business with a European bank for instance practically prevents the European bank from engaging in any economic activity which basis is the US Dollar. It cannot initiate payment instructions in USD to its US correspondent bank and cannot receive USD amounts on its account. Given the prominence of the US Dollar on international markets, such a bank is essentially prevented from operating all along.
But then, why do banks want access to foreign currencies like the US Dollar or the Euro in the first place? Another way of putting it is why do central banks keep foreign currencies reserves? One of the main reasons is to allow themselves the means to protect the local domestic currency. Here’s an example: the central bank of Lebanon was keeping the Lebanese Pound in a strict peg to the US Dollar since 1997, maintaining an FX rate of 1507.5 LBP per USD. To achieve this, whenever the FX rate moved out of the peg target rate in favor of the USD, the bank would pump US Dollars in the markets, providing a higher supply of this currency, thus reducing its price and bringing the FX rate back to the target peg value. A pure supply versus demand mechanism to make it simple.
If foreign currency reserves get scarce, the central bank can always try to scrub Lebanese Pounds out of the market in an effort to decrease supply of LBP, since it cannot increase the USD supply anymore. It does so by increasing the remuneration rate on LBP accounts it is holding. This incentivizes commercial banks operating in the Lebanese markets to put more Lebanese Pounds in their accounts at the central bank, and to trickle this policy down to their individual customers by increasing the rates at which they remunerate customer accounts in LBP. The difference between this rate and the rate at which the central bank remunerates the banks accounts in LBP makes the operation very profitable to commercial banks at the expense of minimal risk it would seem.
The downside of such a policy is that it does not provide incentives for commercial banks to finance the real economy. Instead of lending money deposited with them to entrepreneurs, potential house owners, or students in need of financing, they deposit it at the central bank and gets “free” remuneration on it.What actually happened in Lebanon was that commercial banks started offering remuneration rates of  up to 18% on Lebanese Pound denominated accounts. This means that the central bank of Lebanon was offering commercial banks an even higher remuneration on their accounts. Obviously, no company or business yields net margins of 18%, and no individual can sustain a loan with such high interest rates, which meant that the banks did not have any incentive to finance businesses or sell mortgages, freezing the Lebanese economy in effect. 
The Lebanese economy of the 2020s is a large topic which I will probably tackle in a separate post. One last question though: How is money created? Some say it is “printed”, which is also true to a certain extent. We do use bank notes and they have to be printed somewhere. But the bulk of created money is actually digital: the central bank being the sole actor in a country’s economy to have the privilege to create money, it does so by buying financial assets like sovereign bonds from commercial banks, and crediting their accounts with an amount of money coming out of thin air. As simple as that.
The takeaway of this story is to run whenever someone offers you interest rates which are too good to be true: they are not. Had Lebanese people learnt the mechanisms behind some of the facts above as kids and understood a bit better how an economy works, they would have probably avoided stacking all their net worth in LBP saving accounts to get 18% returns. Too good to be true. 
In conclusion, I would like to make a case for basic economic education at schools, starting at a relatively young age because it would seem that many if not most people do not understand many of the economic concepts behind many aspects of every day life. Like the nature of money and interest rates or the basic operating model of a bank. And knowing that is of paramount importance, there’s just too much at stake. 

You know how a car works, so why would you not know how a bank works?

Let the board sound

Rabih

A proxy to the rather opaque USD/LBP unofficial rate

In the aftermath of the default of the Lebanese government on its debt on March 19th in 2020, the Lebanese pound reached abysmal lows versus the US dollar. Up to that point, the Lebanese government, or more precisely the Banque du Liban, had always followed a policy of strict pegging of the local currency to the US dollar, at a rate of 1507.5 LBP for a Dollar, to instill confidence that investments, typically in bonds, will retain their purchasing power in US dollars when they mature. This rate had been constant since 1997. The Lebanese pound intrinsic weaknesses started to unravel around October 2019 and the peg to the US dollar started to fall apart.

The unofficial FX rates on the local market have surged in the past months, reaching values as high as 15000 LBP per USD according to sources. These sources rely on polls from exchange houses and currency changers on the local market. Given the relatively small size of the Lebanese money market and its opacity, the local unofficial FX rate could benefit from a proxy on international marketplaces with a high enough correlation to allow a coarse evaluation of the fairness of the unofficial FX rate, and identify under or over valuations of the Lebanese Pound.

Lebanese sovereign Eurobonds (Bonds issued by the Lebanese government in a foreign currency, in this case USD instead of LBP) might be a good proxy for the specific case at hand with the following assumptions:

  •      The currency had been successfully pegged to the US dollar for decades  before a first default and an economic downturn.
  •      The country has successfully issued Eurobonds in the past decades, until a first default

When investors buy such a Eurobond at par (at 100% of the face value of the bond, quoted as 100 on fixed income markets), they are expecting full repayment of the principal amount at maturity. In the case of the Lebanese Eurobonds, the investors are expecting full repayment of the principal in USD from an issuer whose domestic currency is the LBP. In other words, they trust the central bank to keep the Lebanese Pound pegged to the US Dollar on a rate close or equal to the current peg rate, allowing the Lebanese government to easily finance itself in USD to repay the principal at maturity.

If the Eurobond is bought at a heavy discount, for example 20% or 30% of the bond face value, it means that the investors foresee a higher risk of default, which in the case of sovereign Eurobonds is due in part to the weakness of the domestic currency. In other words, the investor does not expect the central bank to have the means of enforcing a peg of the Lebanese pound to the USD and hence, the Lebanese government of easily financing itself in USD to repay the principal.

At the time these lines are being written, the Lebanese Eurobonds being considered are quoting at around 12 or 13. One could argue that this price can be seen as a “recovery rate”: the investor accepts to pay 12% of the face value of a Eurobond because it does not expect a scenario worse than a 12% repayment of the principal. The value of every dollar of principal must be reduced by 88% for the investor to incur a loss, having bought the Eurobond at 12% of its face value.  For an issuer like Lebanon which had successfully pegged the domestic currency to USD for decades at 1507.5 LBP per USD, it can be said that the value of every 1507.5 LBP of principal (one US dollar at the time the bond was issued) must be reduced by 88% for the investor to incur a loss, or that the central bank has to sustain an 88% downturn of the USD/LBP rate for the investor to incur a loss, at which point 1507.5 LBP is worth 0.12 USD.

Hence the proxy: USD/LBP black market = USD/LBP peg * 1/Eurobond price = 1507.5 * 1/0.12 = 12562.5. This value is very close to the unofficial FX rate quoted by different sources on the local Lebanese market.

To ensure the soundness of the idea, I have back tested the values of the black-market FX rate for the past year against the price of a Lebanese Eurobond, ISIN XS0250882478, as quoted on the Luxembourg exchange. It is an eight-year Eurobond maturing on April 12, 2021, which makes it old enough to have been issued at a time when the USD/LBP peg was effective and maturing around a year after the first bond default following the economic downturn of the Lebanese republic. This ISIN was suspended on the Luxembourg exchange where the values were taken shortly before its maturity.

USD/LBP rate computed from Eurobond prices versus USD/LBP unofficial rates

In the figure above, on the day of the bond default in March 2020, the bond price used as a proxy gives a USD/LBP rate much higher than the black-market value. This is probably due to the fact that an economy has a given inertia due in part to capital restrictions and other measures imposed by commercial banks and the central bank of Lebanon on depositors to avoid a bank rush and to try to control the FX rate to a certain extent.

Starting July 2020, the curves seem to be much more correlated. In fact, the correlation (Pearson) is computed as 0.771 on the values of both curves between July 29 and March 31. The gap towards the end of October 2020 could be explained by rumors on the formation of a new government by the nominated prime minister, which drove the local unofficial rate down through a relative increase of the confidence in the Lebanese Pound. This gap has persisted until right before the bond maturity, where we see a correction. It could also be due to other biases linked of the exchange where the Eurobond prices were sourced.

Further steps are planned, to refine the findings on this proposed proxy. They include running a back testing exercise on another Lebanese Eurobond and using quotes from a different exchange, for example, USD/LBP rate based on Eurobond XS0471737444 maturing in 2024 and quoted on the Frankfurt exchange.


Let the board sound

Rabih